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I. INTRODUCTION
Professional and collegiate sports are colossal money-making
industries in the United States consisting of ticket sales, concessions,
television deals, internet subscriptions, merchandise and much more.
Sports wagering, however, may be the one aspect of sports that is
bigger than the games themselves. An estimated $4 billion is wagered
annually in Las Vegas alone, in addition to an estimated $80 billion to
$380 billion that is wagered annually through illegal channels.1
Allowing sports wagering to remain illegal nationally and continuing
to have people bet on sports unlawfully is leaving billions of dollars
untaxed and unregulated each year. In the past fifty years, the United
States has experienced a substantial expansion in legalized gambling,
with sports wagering being the only major holdout.2
The barrier that stands in the way of legalized sports wagering is
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which
is a 1992 federal statute that makes wagering on professional and
amateur sports unlawful, except for in a few states that were
grandfathered into the statute.3 At the forefront of the legalization
battle is the state of New Jersey, whose voters have approved sports
wagering through a referendum and a state that could desperately use
the revenue it in order to boost its gambling-fueled economy, but
cannot implement it into its casinos and racetracks because of PASPA.4
The fight has been raging on in courts for years now in NCAA v.
Christie, a series of Third Circuit cases where the professional and
amateur sports leagues (the “Leagues”) challenged New Jersey’s
implementation of legalized sports wagering, arguing that the State’s
acts violated PASPA.5 In 2013, the Third Circuit first held that PASPA
was constitutional and that New Jersey’s attempt to legalize sports
wagering violated PASPA.6 After the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
New Jersey’s second attempt to legalize sports wagering was once

1 Will Hobson, Sports gambling in U.S.: Too prevalent to remain illegal?, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/sportsgambling-in-us-too-prevalent-to-remain-illegal/2015/02/27/f1088e4c-b7d3-11e4-9423-f3
d0a1ec335c_story.html?utm_term=.ece1e446a9fe.
2 Id.
3 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (2015).
4 MaryAnn Spoto, Sports betting backed by N.J. voters, NJ.COM (Nov. 8, 2011, 10:10
PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/nj_residents_vote_on_legalizin.html.
5 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3rd
Cir. 2016).
6 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 240 (holding that nothing in PASPA violates the United States
Constitution).
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again struck down by the Third Circuit, with the dissenting judge in the
first case writing the majority opinion of the second case.7 In late 2015,
an obviously split Third Circuit decided to vacate all of the previous
opinions, and hear the case again en banc.8 In August 2016, the Third
Circuit once again affirmed the principles that the court had previously
set forth, and held that PASPA is constitutional and that New Jersey’s
attempt to legalize sports wagering clearly violated the statute.9
The hypocrisy of the PASPA protections comes in the form of
fantasy sports. These games allow people to create their own teams
based on the players they believe will perform the best during games.
Fantasy sports are legal because they are not gambling under the
Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, which classifies
fantasy sports as legal skill betting, instead of illegal chance betting.10
Although some attorney generals in New York, Illinois and, most
recently, Texas are beginning to challenge the legality of fantasy sports
as lawful forms of gambling, these games continue to operate in most
states.11
PASPA is causing economic harm to New Jersey and other states
that can benefit from sports wagering, as these states are missing out
on large increases in gambling revenue. Since the Third Circuit has
ruled three times on sports wagering, it is now an issue that the
Supreme Court should decide. PASPA is unconstitutional because it
violates core concepts of federalism, and is barring New Jersey from
implementing sports wagering, even though the voters have approved
it.
II. BACKGROUND
A. New Jersey’s Gambling History
New Jersey has a long history of gambling spanning back to the
American Revolution, and it has played a pivotal role in New Jersey’s

7 NCAA, 799 F.3d at 268 (holding that New Jersey’s law violates PASPA because it
authorizes sports gambling by law).
8 NCAA v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
9 NCAA, 832 F.3d at 402 (holding that New Jersey’s law violates PASPA because it
authorizes by law sports gambling, and PASPA remains constitutional).
10 Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, 152 Cong Rec H 4978
§ 101(3)(D)(ix)(II) (2006).
11 Jacob Pramuk, DraftKings, FanDuel lobby Congress amid legal challenges, CNBC
(Jan. 21, 2016 1:24 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/21/draftkings-fanduel-lobbycongress-amid-legal-challenges.html.
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economy ever since.12 During the colonial era, New Jersey’s culture
was much more permissive of gambling than other colonies, using
lotteries to raise money for military supplies, civic projects, and the
construction of what is now Rutgers University.13 In the 1830s, horse
racing began to grow in popularity and became a vital part of New
Jersey’s gambling-funded economy.14 Horse racing continues to
remain popular today, as New Jersey currently operates three
racetracks and multiple off-track betting centers.15 Additionally, statesponsored lotteries operate throughout New Jersey, and are available at
convenience stores, liquor stores, supermarkets, and pharmacies
throughout the State.16 New Jersey does put part of lottery proceeds to
good use, as thirty percent of all unclaimed lottery winnings are
allocated to State institutions and State aid for education.17
In 1974, New Jersey voters first saw, and defeated, casino
gambling on a ballot.18 Then in 1976, a revised referendum was
approved, by a slim margin, that limited gambling to the confines of
the popular shore town, Atlantic City, New Jersey.19 In 1978, Atlantic
City opened Resorts International, its first hotel and casino, and
gambling instantly proved to be a success by surpassing Las Vegas as
the gambling capital of the United States for a period of time.20 Atlantic
City’s beautiful beaches combined with casino gambling, world-class
hotels and entertainment led the City to instantly become a New Jersey
Shore landmark.
Atlantic City experienced a few decades of prosperity, but as time
went on, several factors led to the City’s recent demise, including, the
revitalization of Las Vegas; luxury casinos in Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, and New York; outdated Atlantic City hotels and
casinos; failure to rejuvenate the City’s residential community; and
online gambling. In March 2016, Atlantic City’s failing casinos and
housing crisis caused New Jersey to consider a state-takeover of the

12 New Jersey gambling: A historical snapshot, NJ GAMBLING WEBSITES,
http://www.njgamblingwebsites.com/new-jersey-gambling-history/ (last visited Oct. 16,
2016).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 N.J.S.A. 5:9-17.
18 History of Casino Gambling in Atlantic City, ATLANTIC CITY FREE PUBLIC LIBRARY,
http://www.acfpl.org/ac-history-menu/atlantic-city-heritage-collections/15-hestonarchives/68-history-of-casino-gambling-in-atlantic-city (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
19 Id.
20 New Jersey gambling: A historical snapshot, supra note 12.
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City, which would shut down all nonessential government services.21
Still with all of its issues, Atlantic City’s five casinos generated over
$2.6 million in taxes during July 2016 alone.22 Sports wagering could
help generate even more in taxes payable to New Jersey, bring visitors
back into Atlantic City, and give the City the boost it so desperately
needs in order to bring it back to its glory days.
B. Sports Wagering in the United States and the Rise of Fantasy
Sports
Sports wagering is growing at an exceptionally fast rate, and most
of it goes untaxed and unregulated.23 Nearly $4 billion is bet on sports
each year in Las Vegas, while an estimated $80 billion to $380 billion
is wagered illegally, through offshore online betting houses, office
pools, and neighborhood bookmakers.24 This means that billions of
dollars go unregulated and untaxed on sports wagering alone each year.
In the past fifty years, the gambling industry in the United States has
expanded vastly with the evolution of lotteries, casino gambling, and
online gambling: with the only holdout being sports wagering.25
One of the motivating factors for originally banning sports
wagering was to protect the integrity of highly-profitable professional
and amateur sports, mostly due to the negative stigma attached to
gambling.26 Over time, however, a different, less-negative viewpoint
on sports gambling has arose.27 Sports announcers give their picks for
who is going to win each game, President Obama has been filling out
a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) tournament
bracket each year, and major newspapers and sports websites offer up-

21 Joel Rose, Atlantic City Faces Financial Collapse, Cringes At State Takeover, NPR
(Mar. 24, 2016, 9:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/23/471618590/atlantic-city-facesfinancial-collapse-cringes-at-state-takeover.
22 New Jersey Online Gambling Revenue, PLAY NJ, https://www.playnj.com/newjersey/revenue/ (last updated Dec. 2016).
23 Hobson, supra note 1.
24 Id.
25 See id.
26 See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d
389 (3rd Cir. 2016) (citing S. REP. No. 102-248, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3556, noting the Committee’s concern that “[w]idespread legalization
of sports gambling would inevitably promote suspicion about controversial plays and lead
fans to think ‘the fix was in’ whenever their team failed to beat the point-spread”).
27 Tim Dahlberg, Column: Time to do away with sports betting stigma, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2012, 6:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huffwires/20120526/tim-dahlberg-052612/.
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to-the-minute betting lines.28 Due to the fact that sports wagering has
become more prevalent, it has also become more mainstream and
accepted.
Particularly in the past few years, fantasy sports have taken the
spotlight, especially daily and weekly fantasy sports, where players can
change their team accordingly, considering injuries and poor
performances. As of August 2015, 56.8 million people in the United
States and Canada had already played fantasy sports in 2015 alone.29
This was before football, the most popular fantasy sport, even began its
season.30 Additionally, the number of participants had already
exceeded the more than the 41 million people that had played the entire
previous year.31 Fans now find themselves not only being loyal to their
favorite teams, but also cheering for other teams or individual plays
that will benefit their own fantasy teams each week.32 In 2015 alone,
daily fantasy sports were expected to generate around $2.6 billion in
entry fees, mostly from two main websites, FanDuel and DraftKings.33
These websites allow participants to enter various fantasy games
ranging in size and wager amount.34 The websites allow participants
to enter into new games with new teams every week, instead of being
stuck with the same season-long fantasy teams. This allows players to
enter different games and place different wagers every day.
The legality of online, daily fantasy sports is a highly debated
issue. In 2006, Congress enacted the Internet Gambling Protection and
Enforcement Act (the Act), based on findings that Internet gambling is
primarily funded through payment system instruments, credit cards,
and wire transfers, leading to growing debt collection problems.35 The
Act prohibits placing “bets and wagers” online, unless individual states
allow it. The Act describes “bets and wagers” as the “staking or risking
by any person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of
others, a sporting event, or a game predominantly subject to chance,
upon an agreement or understanding that the person or another person
28 See Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting The Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 589 (2013).
29 John Affleck, What’s behind fantasy football’s surprising popularity, FORTUNE
(Sep.12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/12/fantasy-football-growth/.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Timothy Fong, Daily Fantasy Sports Are Clearly Gambling, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:00AM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-daily-fantasysports-gambling/daily-fantasy-sports-games-are-clearly-gambling.
34 Id.
35 Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, 152 Cong Rec H 4978 § 2 ch.
4(a)(1), (3).
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will receive something of value in the event of a certain outcome.”36
The Act carves out fantasy sports as an exception, because the winning
outcomes reflect the knowledge and skill of the participants.37
Congress takes issue with people placing bets online, and ratified
this Act because of the easy access to the Internet, and the easy access
to obtain money that people cannot afford to lose. At the same time,
however, Congress distinguishes between games of chance, like
roulette, blackjack, and poker, which are illegal online, and games of
skill, like fantasy sports, which are legal.38 In doing so, Congress
declared that participating in online fantasy sports is not illegal
gambling because it does not require the staking or risking of money
subject to chance, but rather subject to skill. Therefore, partaking in
online fantasy sports is legal gambling. 39
To determine whether a game is classified as a game of chance or
skill, courts look to the dominant factor in determining the outcome of
the game.40 Although courts disagree about whether games like poker
and backgammon are chance or skill, there is no doubt that players need
to understand the game and know how to handle certain situations.41
There is still, however, an incredible amount of chance involved in
proving the player’s success.42 This same analysis can be applied to
fantasy sports, as there is skill involved in picking players and knowing
individual matchups for the game, but then there is still an enormous
amount of chance involved in determining the outcome, like player
performance, physical and emotional health, injuries, weather, and
substitutions. For example, in football, a certain running-back may
seem like a great pick for a game, but if the other team comes out and
scores three touchdowns in the first quarter, the running back may not
see much of the ball for the rest of the game because the team may

36

Id. § 101(3)(6)(A).
Id. § 101(3)(D)(ix)(II) (2006) (“participation in any fantasy or simulation sports
game or educational game or contest in which (if the game or contest involves a team or
teams) no fantasy or simulation sports team is based on the current membership of an actual
team that is a member of an amateur or professional sports organization (as those terms are
defined in section 3701 of title 28) and that meets the following conditions: . . . (II) All
winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the participants and are
determined predominantly by accumulated statistical results of the performance of
individuals (athletes in the case of sports events) in multiple real-world sporting or other
events.”).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Michael Trippiedi, Note, Daily Fantasy Sports Leagues: Do You Have The Skill to
Win at These Games of Chance?, 5 UNLV GAMING L.J. 201, 215 (2014).
41 Id. at 216.
42 Id.
37
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favor passing over running to score points faster. The same ratio of
skill to chance is prevalent in daily fantasy sports as in most casino
table games, and none of these games should be classified as having
chance or skill as the dominant factor.
FanDuel and DraftKings contend that fantasy sports are legal
because they are games of skill.43 A few states, however, believe that
fantasy sports are gambling and either have acted, or are considering
acting. For example, Arizona, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana and
Washington have long had prohibitions on fantasy sports.44 In the last
few months of 2015, Nevada and New York took similar stances on the
issue, declaring fantasy sports illegal gambling and sending cease-anddesist letters to both DraftKings and FanDuel.45 On the other hand,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Georgia and New Jersey have not taken
any action yet, but have considered enacting their own rules.46 New
Jersey for example, would much rather see fantasy sports regulated
under state rules than have them completely shut down.47 Although
some states have banned or want to ban daily fantasy sports, they
remain legal in most of the country.
Although the Leagues remain vehemently opposed to statesponsored sports wagering, the Leagues not only approve daily fantasy
sports, but also have no problem taking a piece of the gold mine for
themselves.48 The National Football League (NFL) has allowed teams
to sign multi-year deals with fantasy sports providers, leading the way
for fifteen teams to sign deals including “stadium signage, radio and
digital advertising and other promotions in exchange for an undisclosed
amount.”49 The Major League Baseball (MLB) recently expanded its
exclusive partnership with DraftKings and “has emblazoned its logo
throughout several stadiums this season, including behind home plate

43 Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act, 152 Cong Rec H 4978
§ 101(3)(D)(ix)(II) (2006).
44 David Purdum & Darren Rovell, N.Y. AG declares DraftKings, FanDuel are illegal
gambling, not fantasy, ESPN (Nov. 11, 2015), http://espn.go.com/chalk
/story/_/id/14100780/new-york-attorney-general-declares-daily-fantasy-sports-gambling.
45 See Id.
46 Wayne Perry, New Jersey lawmaker seeks to regulate daily fantasy sports,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 3, 2015, 2:32 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1cbad9eb
f5ba480d88003fea30db5631/new-jersey-lawmaker-seeks-regulate-daily-fantasy-sports-0.
47 Id.
48 See Brent Schrotenboer, FanDuel signs deals with 15 NFL teams, escalating daily
fantasy integration, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2015, 10:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/sports/2015/04/21/daily-fantasy-sports-fanduel-draftkings-nfl-mlb-nhlnba/26149961/.
49 Id.
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and on the centerfield wall.”50 The National Hockey League (NHL)
also signed on with DraftKings, making it the official fantasy game of
the NHL, allowing the site to use all of its intellectual property.51
Finally, not only do thirteen National Basketball Association (NBA)
teams have partnerships with FanDuel, but the NBA itself signed a
contract with the site, including an equity stake in the site.52 It is a
hypocrisy that the Leagues are battling with New Jersey to stop sports
wagering in order to protect the integrity of their games, yet they are
financially intertwined with daily fantasy sports.
The popularity of sports gambling has been mounting over time
and only seems to be growing with the advancement of the Internet. As
fantasy sports continue to gain popularity, it appears the negative
characteristics associated with illegal gambling are beginning to wear
off.53 Fantasy sports do not carry the typical negative stigmas of
gambling like decreased economic productivity, increased crime, and
the erosion of morality that illegal gambling still carries. Instead,
fantasy sports betting lead to an increase in the health of the economy.54
It is very possible that the same could happen to sports wagering,
should it become nationally legal, which could possibly lead to a
stimulation in the economy similar to the effect of daily fantasy sports.
C. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
Enacted in 1992, PASPA makes it unlawful for a governmental
entity or person to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or
authorize by law or compact,
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the
use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more
competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes
participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more
performances of such athletes in such games.55

50

Id.
Darren Heitner, NHL Does Multi-Year Exclusive Deal with DraftKings, FORBES
(Nov. 10, 2014, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2014/11/10/nhldoes-multi-year-exclusive-deal-with-draftkings/.
52 Darren Heitner, FanDuel Signs Multi-Year Partnerships With 13 NBA Teams,
FORBES (Jun. 23, 2015, 8:54 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner
/2015/06/23/fanduel-signs-multi-year-partnerships-with-13-nba-teams/.
53 Nathaniel J. Ehrman, Article, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of Pay-To-Play
Daily Fantasy Sports, 22 SPORTS L.J. 79, 114 (2015).
54 See generally id. at 108–12.
55 28 U.S.C.S. § 3702 (2015).
51
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PASPA does not apply to some states that were exempted from
the statute.56 In order to qualify for the exception, states had to have at
least a ten-year history with licensed gambling, and states that met that
stipulation only had one year to apply to be grandfathered in under the
legislation.57 Nevada, Oregon, and Delaware were the only states that
applied and were exempted from PASPA.58 At the time of PASPA’s
enactment, an exemption was carved out for New Jersey, but only if
New Jersey enacted a sports gambling scheme within one year of
PASPA’s enactment.59 New Jersey did not do so, and, therefore, the
PASPA exemption expired and New Jersey remained barred from
implementing sports wagering.60
Looking to the statute’s legislative history, the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted the problems arising from sports wagering,
highlighting its concern for the integrity of sports, and that widespread
legalization of gambling would promote suspicion about controversial
plays and lead fans to think that games are fixed.61 The Senate Report
characterized sports wagering as a national problem because “the moral
erosion it produces cannot be limited geographically,” and “because
once a state legalizes sports wagering, it will be extremely difficult for
other states to resist the lure.”62 Moreover, the Senate Report stated
“its concurrence with the then-director of New Jersey’s Division of
Gambling Enforcement’s statement that ‘most law enforcement
professionals agree that legalization has a negligible impact on, and in
some ways enhances, illegal markets.’”63
D. Past PASPA Challenges
PASPA remained untouched for nearly two decades before it was
challenged. In recent years, the sports gambling industry has boomed
and states want to take advantage of the positive economic impact that
sports wagering can bring in the form of increased revenue.

56

Id. § 3704.
What is PASPA? – Professional & Amateur Sports Protection Act Of 1992,
LEGALGAMBLINGUSA.COM,
http://www.legalgamblingusa.com/articles/what-is-paspa
.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
58 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259, 261 (3d. Cir. 2015), vacated by NCAA
v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 389
(3rd Cir. 2016).
62 Id.
63 Id.
57
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In 2009, PASPA was first challenged in the Third Circuit case,
Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, where Delaware proposed
allowing three types of sports gambling in the State, including multigame (parlay) betting.64 In 1977, this type of parlay betting had already
been upheld in Delaware because it was confined to just NFL games,
and because it involved three types of sports games, making chance the
dominating factor.65 Here, Delaware argued that because it had
implemented a similar betting scheme in the past and because Delaware
was grandfathered into PASPA, it could then allow the new sports
gambling proposals.66 The Third Circuit held that Delaware could
adopt the new gambling schemes because Delaware was grandfathered
into PASPA, and the proposed gambling scheme was very similar to
the one upheld in 1976.67 Although the Third Circuit upheld
Delaware’s sports gambling scheme, it provided a blow for other states
hoping to legalize sports gambling, as the Third Circuit also upheld
PASPA’s grandfathering clause, continuing to only allow sports
gambling schemes that had been enacted in the past as the only
exceptions to PASPA.68
In 2011, the constitutionality of PASPA was challenged in
Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder. There, a New
Jersey non-profit corporation, which disseminated electronic gaming
information via the Internet, alleged that PASPA violated various
provisions of the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause, the
First Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment,
the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.69 The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the nonprofit corporation’s claim for lack of standing, therefore, not
addressing PASPA’s constitutionality claims.70
The Third Circuit is the only Circuit Court to ever hear a PASPA
challenge, or a case involving sports wagering. The United States
Supreme Court has never heard any case regarding PASPA’s
constitutionality or sports wagering.
64 Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 295 (3d. Cir. 2009),
cert denied, 559 U.S. 1106 (2010).
65 Id. at 296.
66 Id. at 297.
67 Id. at 304 (holding that “under federal law, Delaware may, however, institute multigame (parlay) betting on at least three NFL games, because such betting is consistent with
the scheme to the extent it was conducted in 1976”).
68 Id.
69 Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23383,
at *2–5 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011).
70 Id. at *32 (granting the government’s motion and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint
for lack of standing).
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E. The Sports Wagering Battle in New Jersey
Prior to 2011, New Jersey was against sports wagering, as the
New Jersey Constitution prohibited it, which may be the reason why
New Jersey did not take advantage of PASPA’s exemption within the
one-year window.71 However, the views of New Jersey voters have
changed in the two decades since PASPA’s enactment.72 In 2011, a
New Jersey referendum was held to legalize sports wagering and it was
approved by the voters.73 When asked about the referendum, Senator
Raymond Lesniak, who was a sports wagering advocate, said, “[i]t was
a bigger win than we expected. There’s a strong movement to fight the
federal ban in New Jersey.”74 New Jersey legislators were in favor of
legalizing sports wagering, and with the approval of the referendum,
voters were also onboard with legalizing sports wagering.75
In response to the referendum, the New Jersey Constitution was
amended, stating in relevant part:
It shall also be lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law
wagering at casinos or gambling houses in Atlantic City on
the results of any professional, college, or amateur sport or
athletic event, except that wagering shall not be permitted on
a college sport or athletic event that takes place in New
Jersey or on a sport or athletic event in which any New Jersey
college team participates regardless of where the event takes
place.76
Voters approved the constitutional amendment, and legislators
subsequently enacted the sports wagering law.77 This new law
established a comprehensive regulatory scheme, license requirement
for operators, extensive documentation, minimum cash reserves, and
access to security and surveillance systems.78
Following the enactment of the New Jersey Sports Wagering Law,
the Leagues, which include the NBA, MLB, NCAA, NFL, and NHL,
71

N.J. CONST. Art. IV, § 7, Para. 2.
NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 389
(3rd Cir. 2016).
73 MaryAnn Spoto, Sports Betting Backed by N.J. Voters, NJ.COM (Nov. 8, 2011,
10:10 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/nj_residents_vote_on_legalizin
.html.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 N.J. CONST. Art. IV, § VII, Para. 2(D).
77 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-1 et seq.
78 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259, 262 (3d. Cir. 2015), vacated by NCAA
v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
72
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brought an action against New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
challenging PASPA’s constitutionality and seeking an injunction
(“Christie I”).79 The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey upheld PASPA’s constitutionality, and found that the
Leagues were entitled to summary judgment and a permanent
injunction.80 The case was subsequently appealed to the Third
Circuit.81
First in Christie I, the Third Circuit examined whether the
Leagues had standing to bring the suit.82 Focusing mostly on whether
the Leagues had suffered an “injury-in-fact,” the Leagues argued that
they did have standing because their games were the New Jersey law’s
central focus, and that the increase in sports gambling would put the
integrity of their games at risk.83 The Third Circuit held that
reputational harm is a cognizable injury-in-fact and that the enactment
of the law created increased incentives for game-rigging.84 Therefore,
the Third Circuit held that the Leagues did in fact have standing.85
After holding that the Leagues had standing, the Third Circuit
examined PASPA’s constitutionality. First, the Third Circuit looked at
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.86 Acknowledging that
this power is broad, the court found that both gambling and the
Leagues’ contests (whether considered together or separately) affect
interstate commerce.87 Also, even though New Jersey’s gambling
activities may be purely intrastate themselves, they “substantially
affect interstate commerce given the reach of gambling, sports, and
sports wagering” across state lines.88 The court concluded that
Congress can regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause.89
Next, the court turned to whether PASPA commandeered the
states. New Jersey argued that “PASPA’s operation over their own

79 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 389
(3rd Cir. 2016).
80 NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 579 (D.N.J. 2012) (holding that PASPA is
a constitutional exercise of Congress’s powers pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and does
not violate the Tenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Principles, nor
Equal Footing Doctrine).
81 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 217.
82 Id. at 217–24
83 Id. at 218.
84 Id. at 221–22.
85 Id. at 223–24.
86 Id. at 224.
87 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 224.
88 Id. at 226.
89 Id.
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state law violated the anti-commandeering principle, which bars
Congress from conscripting the states into doing the work of federal
officials.”90 The court rejected New Jersey’s argument, and found that
the principles New Jersey cited may abstractly be used to support their
position, and accepting their position would result in “an undue
expansion of the anti-commandeering doctrine.”91 The court also
placed heavy weight on the fact that the previous statutes that it struck
down under the anti-commandeering principle were affirmative
commands to the states, and nothing like PASPA.92 PASPA operates
as a law of pre-emption, which is constitutional under the Supremacy
Clause.93
Finally, the court analyzed whether PASPA violated equal
sovereignty to the states by allowing the grandfathered states to
continue operating sports wagering schemes while other states, like
New Jersey cannot. The court struck down the equal sovereignty issue,
explaining, “[t]hat [since] New Jersey seeks Nevada’s preferential
treatment, and not a complete ban on the preferences, [it] undermines
[New Jersey’s] invocation of the equal sovereignty doctrine.”94 Also,
the court explained that New Jersey did not cite a case where the
grandfathering rationale was used to justify a violation of equal
sovereignty, which was most likely because “only two Supreme Court
cases in modern times have applied the equal sovereignty principle.”95
In Christie I, the Third Circuit ultimately held that nothing in
PASPA violated the Constitution, as the statute neither exceeded
Congress’s enumerated powers nor violated any principles of
federalism.96 After the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the Leagues, New
Jersey appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but certiorari was
denied.97
Seemingly unfazed by Christie I, New Jersey’s legislature passed
a new law in 2014 which states in relevant part:
[A]ny rules and regulations that may require or authorize any
State agency to license, authorize, permit or otherwise take
action to allow any person to engage in the placement or
acceptance of any wager on any professional, collegiate, or
90

Id. at 227.
Id. at 237.
92 Id.
93 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 237.
94 Id. at 239.
95 Id. at 240.
96 Id.
97 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259, 263 (3d. Cir. 2015), vacated by NCAA
v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
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amateur sport contest or athletic event, or that prohibit
participation in or operation of a pool that accepts such
wagers, are repealed.98
This new law permitted New Jersey casinos and racetracks to
allow sports betting without state regulation and licensing.99 Governor
Christie explained that he signed the bill into law because it adhered to
PASPA, responded to the issues of the federal courts, and specified that
no one under the age of twenty-one could bet, and that bets were not
allowed to be placed on games involving New Jersey teams, or events
in New Jersey.100
The enactment of the 2014 Law led the Leagues to bring about a
second case challenging the Law under PASPA (“Christie II”).101 As
it did in Christie I, the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey once again granted summary judgment in favor of the
Leagues and issued a permanent injunction against New Jersey.102
New Jersey subsequently appealed to the Third Circuit for a second
time.103
In 2015, the Third Circuit once again struck down New Jersey’s
attempt to legalize sports wagering in Christie II.104 The court reasoned
that: (1) although the 2014 Law allowed sports wagering at casinos and
racetracks, conduct of the sort is completely prohibited by PASPA; (2)
although the 2014 Law is labeled as a repealer, it is actually an
authorization; and (3) the court “will not read statutory provisions to be
surplusage,” and, therefore, the statute clearly violates PASPA.105 The
result of Christie II’s was to leave sports wagering unlawful in New
Jersey.
On October 14, 2015, the Third Circuit vacated its opinion in
Christie II, and granted an en banc hearing of the case.106 In August
2016, the Third Circuit’s en banc decision once again held that the 2014
Law violated PASPA because it authorized, by law, sports gambling,
and that PASPA continues to remain constitutional.107 In this Third
98

N.J. Stat. § 5:12A-7.
Id.
100 Brent Johnson, Christie signs law allowing sports betting in N.J., NJ.COM (Oct. 17,
2014, 4:53PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/10/chris_christie_signs_law_
allowing_for_sports_betting_in_nj.html.
101 NCAA, 799 F.3d at 259.
102 Id. at 263.
103 Id. at 264.
104 Id. at 267.
105 Id. at 264–67.
106 NCAA v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
107 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016).
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Circuit decision, the Court focused heavily on the anti-commandeering
doctrine, once again ruling that PASPA does not present states with a
coercive binary choice or affirmative command.108 Therefore, it did
not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.109
On October 7, 2016, New Jersey petitioned for writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court, and as of the date of this comment, the petition
is pending.110 Although PASPA does violate principles of federalism,
sports wagering cannot remain illegal under PASPA, while fantasy
sports continue to be legal. Per sports-law expert Daniel Wallach, “the
rise of daily fantasy sports . . . may pave the way for legalized sports
gambling overall in the United States.”111 Wallach believes that
Congress cannot have it both ways, and must either apply PASPA to
daily fantasy sports, or repeal PASPA altogether.112
III. ANALYSIS
A. Federalism Basis
During the Constitutional Convention, federalism played an
integral part in keeping the country bound to a common core of
governance, while preserving the individual identity of the sovereign
states. During the times leading up to the creation of the United States
Constitution, James Madison described federalism as, “the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments . . . [t]he different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself.”113 Alexander Hamilton agreed that “the system, though it may
not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one.”114 The
inclusion of federalism with two distinct governments was a substantial
revision to the Articles of Confederation, and formed the basis for the
United States Constitution.
108

Id. at 400–02.
Id. at 402.
110 Christie
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/christie-v-national-collegiate-athleticassociation-2/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
111 Matt Bonesteel, New Jersey’s attempt at legalized sports betting suffers another big
setback in court, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
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112 Id.
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Concepts of federalism are found throughout the Constitution, but
three main areas apply to PASPA. First, the Supremacy Clause
establishes that the Constitution and federal laws and treaties made
under the Constitution, “shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”115 Next, the Commerce
Clause confers upon Congress an express provision to regulate
interstate commerce “among the several States.”116 Finally, the Tenth
Amendment expressly states that powers not delegated to the federal
government are “reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”117 These provisions make the Constitution and federal law
supreme over state law, but also gives states their own power to make
their own laws where the federal government does not have authority.
The Supreme Court has spoken on issues of federalism stemming
from the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment numerous
times.118 First, in South Carolina v. Baker, at issue was a federal statute
that removed “the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on
publicly offered long-term bonds unless the bonds were issued in
registered form.”119 The Court held that the statue did not violate the
Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism because: (1) the states
must use the political process to protect themselves from congressional
regulation, and South Carolina was not deprived from using the
political process; and (2) the statute was a regulatory scheme and did
not control or influence the manner in which states could regulate
private parties, and the “commandeering” that occurs, in an inevitable
consequence of the regulation.120
Next, in New York v. United States, a federal statute was at issue
regarding low-level radioactive waste by the states, and the statute
included a take-title provision that forced states to “take title” to waste
if it was not disposed of by a certain date.121 The statute was struck
down because it unconstitutionally compelled the states to act or
administer a federal regulatory program.122 The Court relied on
principles of federalism throughout the opinion.123 First, the Court
115

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
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explained that state residents have the ability to decide whether or not
the state will comply with federal policy choices, and forcing states to
regulate diminishes accountability on both the federal and state
levels.124 Although Congress has powers to govern directly, the
Constitution does not force states to directly govern according to
Congress’s instructions.125 Congress does not have the power to simply
“commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”126
The Court also clarified that although the federal government can
preempt state regulation contrary to federal interest and hold out
incentives to states for not complying, the Constitution does not
authorize “Congress simply to direct the States to provide for the
disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders.”127
New York ultimately held that Congress violated the Tenth Amendment
when it directed the states to regulate in a particular way regarding
radioactive waste.128
Additionally, in Printz v. United States, at issue was a federal
statute’s provisions that required the Attorney General to establish a
national system for distributing firearms, and forced distributors to
instantly perform background checks on possible gun owners.129
Relying on the New York holding, the Court struck down the statue as
unconstitutional because it compelled the states to enforce a federal
regulatory program.130 The Court reasoned that “[t[he Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program.”131 In addition, it makes no difference whether policymaking
is involved, and there is no need for a case-by-case analysis, because
such commands are simply unconstitutional and violate dual
sovereignty.132 In New York, the Court held that Congress cannot
compel the states to act or enforce a regulatory program,133 and then in
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Printz, the Court held that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition
by recruiting state officers directly.134
Finally, in Reno v. Condon, the Court was faced with a federal
statute that regulated the disclosure of personal information contained
in state motor vehicle department’s records, and restricted states’
ability to disclose a driver’s personal information without the driver’s
consent.135 Similar to the statute at issue in Baker, the Court upheld the
statute because it was consistent with the constitutional principles of
federalism set forth in both New York and Printz, and did not require
the states to enact any laws or regulations.136 The Court reasoned that
the statute did not require the States to regulate their own citizens, and
did not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of any federal
statutes.137
The Commerce Clause is yet another important federalism basis.
The Supreme Court has established a legal framework to determine
when Congress has the power to regulate under the provision. The
Commerce Clause gives Congress “considerabl[e] . . . latitude in
regulating conduct and transactions.”138 Congress may regulate an
activity that “substantially affects interstate commerce” if it “arise[s]
out of or [is] connected with a commercial transaction.”139 Even where
activities are purely intrastate, Congress can still regulate them if they
substantially affect interstate commerce.140 Where an activity
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,
and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or
‘indirect.’141
From the aforementioned analysis, it is clear that the Commerce
Clause is a broad constitutional power that gives Congress much
discretion in regulating commerce amongst the states.
The Constitution itself, as well as the foregoing United States
Supreme Court cases, have established the precedent that federal courts
must rely on when dealing with federalism issues. New York and Printz
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
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are the only two cases in which the Supreme Court has struck down
statutes under the anti-commandeering doctrine, and NCAA marks the
first time that the Third Circuit has heard such an issue.142
B. Application to PASPA
PASPA violates the core principles of federalism that are
enumerated in the Constitution and clarified by the Supreme Court.
The three federalism issues involved in PASPA are: (1) whether
Congress can regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause;
(2) whether PASPA violates equal sovereignty of the States; and (3)
whether PASPA commandeers the states.143
First, Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”144
Congress may regulate any economic activity that “substantially affects
interstate commerce” if it “arise[s] out of or is connected with a
commercial transaction.”145 There is little doubt that Congress can
regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause. Both sports and
gambling (considered either separately or together) are economic
activities, and they both substantially affect interstate commerce.146
Additionally, PASPA does not unconstitutionally regulate purely local
activities.147
PASPA, however, does direct the states on how to act, rather than
regulate interstate commerce. Guided by federalism principles,
“[s]tates are better positioned to craft state-specific solutions to local
concerns, thereby serving as laboratories for novel policies.”148 The
government that is closest to the people understands the specific details
surrounding the circumstances, and thus is more responsive to those
who are affected, rather than the more distant government.149 When
drafting PASPA, Congress wanted to curtail the negative effects sports
gambling would have on professional and amateur sports, as well as
limit the negative effects of gambling in general.150 PASPA, however,
142 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 229 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 389
(3rd Cir. 2016).
143 Id. at 224.
144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
146 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 224–25.
147 Id. at 225–26.
148 Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute in Support of
Petitioners at 8, Christie v. NCAA, 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1105 (Mar. 17, 2014)
(No. 13-967).
149 Id.
150 NCAA, 730 F.3d at 216.
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does not keep states, like New Jersey, which could use the economic
increase from sports gambling, in mind. New Jersey has a history of
gambling and, currently, a strong reliance on gambling. As such, New
Jersey could use sports wagering to boost its economy. Since each state
knows best of whether it could benefit from something, like sports
wagering, it should be an issue left to the states to decide. For these
reasons, sports wagering should be a locally-regulated activity and not
congressionally banned.
The problem with relying on Congress’s Commerce Clause
power, is that PASPA is a reach of the power that goes too far. The
Commerce Clause only allows Congress to regulate interstate
commerce directly, “it does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”151 By enacting
PASPA, Congress did exactly what the Court in New York said was
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. PASPA is not a
regulatory scheme, and while Congress could have regulated sports
gambling directly under the Commerce Clause, it did not.152 Instead,
“[Congress] chose to set federal parameters as to how states may
regulate sports gambling.”153 There is “no case law that allows
Congress to achieve federal policy objectives by dictating how states
regulate sports gambling.”154 PASPA does not regulate state activities
or interstate commerce, but rather, it seeks to control or influence how
states regulate private parties, which is a distinction that the Supreme
Court has recognized as significant in Baker, Reno, and New York.155
Furthermore, an equal sovereignty issue arises, because PASPA
grandfathered a few states into the statute, and thus does not ban sports
wagering in those states.156 The equal sovereignty principle has been
understood to apply to the Commerce Clause.157 The Constitution’s
framers, as well as case law that follows, provided “evidence that the
Commerce Clause did not allow regulations inconsistent with the equal
sovereignty principle.”158 There has also been some evidence in the
Supreme Court of this as well, especially through Justice Ginsburg’s
recognition that statutes enacted under congressional powers other than
151
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the Fifteenth Amendment, “most notably statutes enacted pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, raise ‘equal sovereignty’ issues.”159
By continuing to allow sports wagering in a few states, PASPA
not only fails to achieve its main goal of keeping sports games
legitimate, because there are still places available for people to go and
bet on games, but also treats the states unfairly. Therefore, PASPA’s
ban on sports wagering in only some states is a violation of the equal
sovereignty principle and too broad a use of the Commerce Clause.
Applying the equal sovereignty principle to the Commerce Clause will
“prevent ‘a few States in Congress [from] secur[ing] a monopoly of
certain branches of trade and business to themselves, to the injury, if
not to the destruction, of their less favored neighbors.’”160 Currently,
since only a few states can implement sports wagering, those states
hold a monopoly in the nation for legalized sports wagering. If
Congress wanted to regulate sports wagering for its negative effects,
then it would either repeal PASPA and regulate how state gambling
schemes are implemented, or it would prohibit all states from allowing
sports wagering. Until that point, PASPA stands as a violation to the
equal sovereignty principle and is too far a reach of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power.
Next, as illustrated in New York and Printz, the federal
government cannot direct states to enact legislation, or “commandeer”
the states, nor can it direct state officials to implement federal policy.161
As laid out in New York, Congress does not have authority to directly
require that the states do or not do something, and while the Commerce
Clause power allows Congress to regulate interstate commerce
directly, “it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’
regulation of interstate commerce.”162 Additionally, in Printz, the
Court held that Congress cannot compel state officers directly, nor can
it “issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems,
nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”163
As Justice Vanaskie explained in the dissent of Christie I, “[n]o legal
principle exists for finding a distinction between the federal
159 Id. at 7–8 (citing Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting)).
160 Id. at 12 (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States § 957 (Thomas Cooley ed. 1873)).
161 NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 244 (3d. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2866 (2014), and aff’d, 799 F.3d 259 (3d. Cir. 2015), and aff’d en banc, 832 F.3d 389
(3rd Cir. 2016) (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
162 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
163 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
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government compelling state governments to exercise their sovereignty
to enact or enforce laws on the one hand, and restricting state
governments from exercising their sovereignty to enact or enforce laws
on the other hand.”164 Guided by previous Supreme Court opinions,
Congress may regulate the commercial activity themselves, provided
states have a choice about whether to implement regulations consistent
with federal standards, let federal regulation preempt state law, require
states to consider federal regulations, or even encourage states to
regulate in a particular way; but Congress cannot compel states to
implement federal policy, or commandeer them.165
Here, there is no doubt that PASPA “regulate[s] state
governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”166 PASPA does this
in a selective, uneven and random way, by only prohibiting sports
wagering in forty-seven states, but still allowing it in a few. PASPA
prohibits some states from authorizing sports wagering and dictates the
way states regulate interstate commerce, therefore, contravening
principles of federalism.167 The Supreme Court “has been explicit” that
“the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress
the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’
instructions,” and this is exactly what PASPA does.168
Although New York and Printz both involved statutes in which
Congress affirmatively forced the states to engage in an act, the
principles set forth apply to cases where Congress prohibits certain
conduct, like PASPA. As Judge Vanaskie pointed out, affirmative
commands to engage in conduct can be rephrased as prohibitions
against not engaging in that same conduct.169 Judge Vanaskie went on
to explain how permitting negative commands to state governments
will alter New York’s and Printz’s holdings that limited Congress’s
power to compel states to adopt federal policy.170 Separating negative
prohibitions from affirmative mandates nullifies important structural
protections inherent in the concept of dual sovereignty.171
Compelling the states to regulate or not to regulate takes away the
political accountability that federalism sought to promote. When the
164
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federal government directs states to regulate, the state is usually blamed
for the negative effects of the regulation, especially when the regulation
is politically unpopular.172 When states are forced to adopt federal
regulatory programs, Congress can take credit for solving problems
without having to ask its constituents to pay for the solutions with
higher federal taxes, and the states are put in the position of taking the
blame for its burdensomeness and defects.173 New Jersey voters
approved sports wagering and, therefore, it is easy for voters to blame
the State for not having it implemented, while Congress is really at
fault. States can operate some forms of gambling, like lotteries and
casinos, while others, like sports wagering, remain illegal because of
policy choices that Congress chose to implement; therefore, creating
accountability concerns undermining principles of federalism.174
PASPA has done exactly that in prohibiting the states from
implementing sports wagering, and leaving the states to bear the crux
of public disapproval.
Although the federal government cannot force the states to adopt
policy, it does have the power to regulate the states through preemption,
which makes state laws that conflict with federal laws invalid.175 If
Congress identifies a problem that “falls within its realm of authority”
then it may provide a solution directly or provide incentives for states
to comply with the solution.176 It thus follows that a state law contrary
to a federal regulatory or deregulatory scheme is void under the
Supremacy Clause and principles of preemption.177
PASPA, however, does not operate under a regulatory or
deregulatory scheme. PASPA does not tell the states how to regulate
sports wagering, but rather completely prohibits states from
“sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], promot[ing], licens[ing], or
authoriz[ing]” gambling on sports.178 Also, it is not a deregulatory
measure, as its purpose was to “stem the spread of state-sponsored
sports gambling, not let it go unregulated.”179 The majority opinion in
Christie I does not cite to any case that sustained a “federal statute that
purported to regulate the states under the Commerce Clause where
172
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there was no underlying federal scheme of regulation or
deregulation.”180 Therefore, “PASPA stands alone in telling the states
that they may not regulate an aspect of interstate commerce that
Congress believes should be prohibited.”181 PASPA is unconstitutional
because its prohibition of state-authorized sports gambling does not
emanate from a federal regulatory scheme that expressly or implicitly
preempts state regulation that would conflict with federal policy, but
instead attempts to implement federal policy by telling the states that
they may not regulate an otherwise unregulated activity.182
Finally, although the Third Circuit has heard challenges on
PASPA before, the Circuit is not bound by stare decisis to rule PASPA
constitutional based on federalism grounds.183 In Office of the
Commissioner of Baseball, the Third Circuit dealt with the question of
which sovereign had the authority, under either the “usual” or “altered”
constitutional balance, to regulate sports gambling, and held that
Congress has the authority to regulate sports gambling when it does so
itself.184 In this case, however, the Third Circuit was faced with the
issue of whether Congress has the authority to regulate how states
regulate sports gambling.185
PASPA violates core concepts of federalism, and
unconstitutionally regulates the states in their regulation of sports
gambling. PASPA violates principles of federalism articulated by the
Supreme Court, especially those principles explained in New York and
Printz.186
C. Impact on New Jersey
New Jersey is stuck in the middle of this intra circuit conflict
about whether PASPA is unconstitutional.187 Christie II changed what
Christie I said was wrong about the New Jersey Sports Wagering Law,
but the analysis and holdings of both cases undermine the Constitution
and the Supreme Court.188
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Additionally, New Jersey voters, who approved sports wagering
in the state, are suffering. The voters are frustrated that what they
approved has not been implemented. Additionally, Monmouth Park
Racetrack and other racetracks in New Jersey, which badly need sports
wagering to survive, cannot yet accept wagers, and as casinos continue
to close, Atlantic City needs an economic boost that sports wagering
can bring.189 Sports gambling can bring New Jersey’s economy exactly
what it needs. There are multiple ways in which sports wagering can
increase state revenue including: recapturing money lost to illegal
gambling; collecting taxes and fees from private casinos; encouraging
people to get out to casinos and racetracks where they will spend more
money on gambling, restaurants, and entertainment; and increasing
traffic in casinos and racetracks, which can lead to increased
employment.190 Sports gambling is a multi-billion dollar business, and
by making it legal, it could get even bigger and have a positive impact
on economies.
Look to Nevada, a state grandfathered into PASPA, for example.
There, legal sports wagering brings 30 million visitors to Nevada each
year and provides employment for thousands of people.191 That
equates to millions of people spending millions of dollars each year on
hotels, amenities, restaurants, and entertainment. New Jersey is
currently not able to experience this boom in economic growth because
sports wagering is illegal, so people stay home and bet on unregulated,
black market games, instead of visiting the State’s casinos and
racetracks where they would spend more money than just that spent on
wagers.
IV. CONCLUSION
PASPA should be ruled unconstitutional as it is too broad an
implementation of the Commerce Clause, violates the Tenth
Amendment and equal protection of the states, and commandeers the
states. The desire for a separation of state and federal governments
played an integral part in the Constitution’s creation. Social issues, like
sports wagering, should be left up to the states, as each state is more intuned to its citizens’ wants and needs than the federal government.
Additionally, PASPA bars states, like New Jersey, from the
opportunity to regulate and tax a lucrative activity that is currently
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occurring mostly underground.
PASPA cites worries about
maintaining sports’ integrities as a reason for its existence, yet fantasy
sports, which create the same, and if not more worries, are still legal.
As a result, New Jersey, which desperately could use sports wagering
to improve its economy, is not able to implement this type of gambling
into its casinos and racetracks, even though the voters have already
approved it.
In a song about Atlantic City, New Jersey’s own rock laureate,
Bruce Springsteen, may have predicted the City’s fate, singing,
“[e]verything dies baby that’s a fact, but maybe everything that dies
someday comes back.”192 Although Atlantic City may be going
through financial and social difficulties, if PASPA is ruled
unconstitutional for violating principles of federalism, then legal sports
wagering can give Atlantic City, and the rest of New Jersey, the
economic boom that it desperately needs in order revive its gamblingfueled economy.
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